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Abstract
In February 2021, Winter Storm Uri exposed the Texas grid to a spike in
electricity demand and simultaneously a sharp drop in supply. The long
duration of cold temperatures resulted in an electricity shortage, causing 4.5
million Texans to be without power for multiple days. Subsequently,
questions circulated about how such a tragedy occurred in an energy-rich
state. In the 87th session, the Texas Legislature attempted to correct the
underlying issues brought to light by Winter Storm Uri. However, many of
the problems that caused the tragedy will likely persist without additional
legislation addressing market incentives and the uneven playing field
between different types of generators. This paper examines and provides a
technical breakdown of what occurred in the tragic winter storm and offers
concrete statutory reform to improve the reliability and resilience of the
unique Texas grid.
I. Introduction
Texas was 4 minutes and 37 seconds away from having a system-wide
blackout that could have left twenty-six million Texans without power or
energy for months.1 In February 2021, 4.8 million electricity customers2
1. Erin Douglas, Texas was “Seconds and Minutes” Away from Catastrophic Months
Long Blackouts, Officials Say, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.texastribune.
org/2021/02/18/texas-power-outages-ercot/; Robert Bryce, Why Fixing the Texas Power
Grid is so Complicated, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbryce/
2021/04/19/this-graphic-illustrates-the-complexity-of-trying-to-fix-the-ercot-mess/?sh=7987
ecc8268a.
2. Erin Douglas & Mitchell Ferman, Texas Lawmakers Want to Prevent Another
Power Crises: But the Legislation Doesn’t Go Far Enough to Do That, Critics Say, TEX.
TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/03/30/power-grid-texaslegislature-prevention/. The winter storm’s impacts did not stop with the electricity and gas
infrastructure. See Jess Donald, Winter Storm Uri, The Economic Impact of the Storm (Oct.
2021),
https://comptroller.texas.gov/economy/fiscal-notes/2021/oct/winter-storm-impact.
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lost power, causing numerous deaths and an unfortunate spiral of high
electricity prices, property damages, and power and water shortages.3 At
one point, up to twelve million Texans were without water or under boil
advisories due to either low water pressure or damaged treatment facilities. 4
In one week alone, electricity sales in Texas topped 46 billion dollars—
more than five times what the state spent on electricity in all of 2020.5
Questions began to circulate about “what broke” as such tragedy seemed to
present an irony in an energy-rich state.6
Two narratives have circulated from the historic freeze.7 First, the
extreme and severe weather was the reason for the capacity shortage.8 It is
undeniable that the conditions were unprecedented as every county in Texas
was under a severe weather warning; however, much of the information and
data used to prevent unprecedented results were predictable and
preventable.9 Second, due to the extreme temperatures, a large number of
coal and gas plants “froze.”10 This interesting paradox requires Texas to
point its finger inwards because these types of power plants operate in

php. The storm also directly and indirectly impacted other infrastructures, including water
and housing. Id.
3. See Kara Norton, Why Texas Was Not Prepared for Winter Storm Uri, NOVA (Mar.
25, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/texas-winter-storm-uri/ (statement of
University of Texas at Austin Professor Michael Webber) ("So we have a water problem-freezing water, become[s] a gas problem, become[s] a power problem, become[s] a bigger
gas problem, become[s] a bigger power problem, become[s] a water problem and a
humanitarian crisis").
4. Phil Helsel & Yuliya Talmazan, Texas Water Shortage Adds to Power Crisis as
New Winter Storm Moves in, NBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/texas-contending-water-nightmare-top-power-crisis-n1258208.
5. Kathryn Blunt & Russell Gold, ‘A Failure of Texas Size Proportions’ – State
Debates How to Overhaul its Power Market, THE WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/a-failure-of-texas-size-proportionsstate-struggles-to-overhaul-its-powermarket-11618565415?page=1.
6. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=TX (last visited Dec. 10,
2021) (reporting that Texas is the nation's top oil and gas producing state, leads the nation in
wind-powered generation and produces almost one-third of all U.S. wind power, and
"produces more electricity than any other state").
7. Brent Bennett, Here’s What Happened: Seeking Answers for Winter 2021 Texas
Blackouts, LIFE: POWERED (Feb. 17, 2021), https://lifepowered.org/heres-what-happenedseeking-answers-for-the-winter-2021-texas-blackouts/.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.weather.gov/hgx/
2021ValentineStorm (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
10. Id.
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much colder conditions worldwide.11 Thus, the cascading failures were
likely due to a more deep-rooted issue.12
As hearings and legislation unfolded, Texas sought to pinpoint what
broke.13 But, ultimately, the problem with the narratives that have prompted
the allocation of blameworthiness is that they avoid addressing the uneven
playing field that made it inevitable.14 Legislators and Texans need to know
what went wrong with the long-term policy decisions that made the event
inevitable and, more importantly, why this storm's consequences are likely
to be repeated if statutory reform is not implemented. The vast majority of
legislation focused on weatherization, gas supply, and coordination of
Texas’s energy systems avoids the fundamental issue that Texas never had
enough reliable capacity to make it through this event without
blackouts.15 Even if it had been a normal day for the Texas grid with
electricity generators operating at the same level of reliability, “the
combination of high demand, low wind speeds, and no sun during the cold
mornings and nights meant that there were periods of time when blackouts
were inevitable.”16
To avoid repeating the cycle, the Texas Legislature must concretely
address concerns that demand will continue to exceed supply in the wake of
climate change and unpredictable seasons.17 When analyzing targeted
reserve margins and the lack of investment in the years prior, it is evident
that supply availability has not kept up and will not keep up without
interference by state leaders. As the market stands, renewable generators
are in a no-lose situation. Additionally, the electric grid’s immense scale
challenges the storage built to maintain the variability of these generators.18
Thus, there is only one promising option for protection in the immediate
future: to build more gas power plants through pricing incentives and
11. Reese Oxner et al., Catastrophic Texas Power Outages Prompt Finger Pointing and
Blame Shifting at Legislative Hearings, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.
texastribune.org/2021/02/25/texas-house-senate-ercot/.
12. Bennett, supra note 7.
13. Oxner et al., supra note 11.
14. Bennett, supra note 7.
15. Brent Bennet, Forget About What Broke: The Texas Blackout was Inevitable, LIFE:
POWERED (Mar. 3, 2021), https://lifepowered.org/forget-about-what-broke-the-texasblackout-was-inevitable/.
16. Id.
17. See Ralph A. Cantafio & Miles C. Nowak, Solving the Interconnection Problem, 7
A&M J. PROP. L. 526, 528 (2021).
18. See infra Part 0.0 (explaining that Texas’ reliance on wind and solar is challenged
by the duration and scale needed to keep up with the demand of the electric grid).
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accountability. This comment argues that while the omnibus bills passed by
the Texas Legislature in the 87th session have opened the door to
significant market reforms, much more is needed to ensure reliability in this
unique market. Part II provides a factual background of Winter Storm Uri
and Texas's complex, unique system.19 Part III proposes concrete statutory
reform by the Texas Legislature to ensure reliability;20 and, lastly, Part IV
explores practical implications at both the federal and state level that
necessitate urgency in the statutory reform.21
II. Energy Implications from Winter Storm Uri
A. Oversight and Objective of the Energy Market
Texas leads the nation in electricity and natural gas production and
consumption.22 For most Texas consumers, energy is provided through an
intrastate grid, managed by an independent operator.23 Because Texas is
operated independently, it has limited interconnection to the other two main
electrical grids serving the U.S. and relies on its own resources to be selfsufficient.24
Natural gas plays a huge role in providing electricity generation in
Texas.25 However, Texas is has made huge pushes in the development and
generation of electricity from renewable energy sources.26 Despite the
state’s natural gas and renewable generation being operated independent of
the electricity industry, different state agencies have regulatory oversight
over the two sectors.27 The Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC)

19. See infra Part 0 (analyzing the technical breakdown of Winter Storm Uri and the
critical bounds in which the grid operates).
20. See infra Part 0 (discussing how the proposed statutory amendment will cure issues
in the current market structure).
21. See infra Part 0 (concluding that the proposed amendment is even more pivotal
given the pending federal legislation that affects the Texas market).
22. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 6.
23. OFFICE OF ELEC., https://www.energy.gov/oe/information-center/educationalresources/electricity-101 (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
24. See Terry Spry Jr., Does Texas Have an Independent Power Grid, and What Does
That Mean? (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.king5.com/article/news/verify/texas-independentpower-grid/507-6192cf48-4bf4-4a82-8586-0e5c0a549707.
25. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 6.
26. See, e.g., id.
27. Peter Cramton, Fostering Resiliency with Good Market Design: Lessons From
Texas 27 (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2020-2024/cramton-lessonsfrom-the-2021-texas-electricity-crisis.pdf.
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oversees electricity services, and the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC)
regulates the natural gas sector.28 The PUC’s oversight over the electricity
industry includes responsibility for overseeing the operations of the electric
grid operator, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).29
ERCOT is a non-profit corporation that represents multiple parties,
including generators, utilities, and consumers. 30 ERCOT's main role in
the operation of the unique grid is to oversee the entire system, thus
“managing the flow of electrical power to twenty-six million customers
within the state of Texas,” representing approximately ninety percent of
Texas's electrical load. 31 ERCOT is not directly involved in owning and
operating facilities, but they tell the operators of generation facilities
when to start up and shut down. This determination is highly dependent
on the electrical demand.32 To perform this task, ERCOT uses the
weather to understand electrical demand.33 “Weather is also central to
understanding production from renewable sources.”34 ERCOT evaluates
multiple weather forecasts.35 Some are seasonal, some are close to realtime, and some look far ahead.36 Updated continuously, ERCOT aggregates
the studies into a load-and-supply forecast and utilizes them in analyzing
grid demands.37
Electricity is produced, transmitted, and consumed in the same
instant; and if tracking that is not hard enough, the supply of electricity
has to match the demand simultaneously. 38 Because demand is
constantly changing throughout the day depending on various
circumstances, ensuring the grid starts up and shuts down at the
appropriate times can be very tedious. 39 Power demand “usually drops
28. See, e.g., PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/about/
mission.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 2021); R.R. COMM’N, https://www.rrc.texas.gov/oil-andgas/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
29. Cramton, supra note 27, at 26−27.
30. ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/about (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
31. ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/219736/ERCOT_Fact_Sheet_2.12.
21.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
32. See Cramton, supra note 27, at 2−3.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/energy/about-us-electricitysystem-and-its-impact-environment (last visited Dec. 10, 2021) (explaining how electricity
is delivered to consumers through a complex network).
39. See id.
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due to mild weather and at night when people are asleep”; thus, the grid
needs generators to shut down. 40 If the grid did not do this, the
frequency of the AC power would speed up above 60 Hertz (Hz).41
ERCOT operates using the principle known as alternating current, and is
“designed for current and voltage to oscillate at a frequency of 60 cycles
per second, or 60 Hz.”42 When demand rises, the grid needs generators to
(1) be available and (2) match the current.43 Otherwise, frequency will
fall below 60 Hz because the demand is bogging the generators down.44
If grid frequency falls below 59.4 Hz, ERCOT is made aware that the load
is large relative to demand.45 The consequences are massive if the
frequency deviates by too much because the whole grid is magnetically
coupled.46 When parts of the system lose synchronization, both
generators and equipment connected to the grid can face adverse
circumstances.47 “Most parts of the grid, including generation facilities,
have breakers that trip to isolate equipment if the frequency deviates
too far to prevent tearing apart.”48 The breakers in one's house monitor
electrical current. 49 The breaker will trip if you plug in too many things
into one circuit.50 The breakers on the grid work in a very similar way.51
However, the breakers on the grid monitor frequency. Unfortunately,
"unlike one's house, where restoring power is a quick fix, large power
generating stations don't turn on and off with a flip of the switch." 52
40. PRACTICAL ENG’G, What Really Happened During the Texas Power Grid Outage
(Mar. 23, 2021), https://practical.engineering/blog/2021/3/22/what-really-happened-duringthe-texas-power-grid-outage.
41. See OFFICE OF ELEC., https://www.energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policycoordination-and-implementation/transmission-planning/recovery-act-0 (last visited Dec. 10,
2021).
42. Carey W. King et al., The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric
Grid Blackouts (July 2021), https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/resources/reports/UTAustin_
(2021)_EventsFebruary2021TexasBlackout_(002)FINAL_07_12_21.pdf.
43. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
44. Id.
45. King et al., supra note 42, at 26 n.31.
46. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
47. Id.; see King et al., supra note 42, at 26 (“This automatic shutdown lowers the risk
of exposure to harmful vibrations and heat that can damage generation equipment if
operating at low frequency for too long.”).
48. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Therefore, one of the most critical parts of ERCOT's role in managing
the power grid is matching supply and demand to maintain a stable
frequency for reliability.53
ERCOT was under a national microscope during Winter Storm Uri.54
However, ERCOT’s approach to managing the grid is unique given the
market in which it operates. Market forces are heavily relied upon to
provide enough generation to run the grid effectively.55 Thus, ERCOT must
also consider adequately incentivizing generators to guarantee the supply
meets the demand of the electric grid.56 Whether ERCOT can continue to
operate without additional legislative guidance is an inquiry that can be
assessed by looking into the operating principles it uses.
B. Electricity and Natural Gas Financial Flows and Prices
ERCOT's day-to-day operations in Texas's energy market are an
essential part of this story. 57 “ERCOT administers day-ahead and realtime markets for energy, as well as a day-ahead market for ancillary
services (AS).”58 Unlike other markets that, the wholesale electricity
market in Texas is energy-only thus it does not pay generators to secure
capacity in the future 59 That means only if a generator actually puts
power on the grid, will it get paid for it.60 Market participants or
electricity generators are relied upon to ensure enough supply is available.61
But the Texas grid does not just depend on the willingness of generators
alone; “caps on market-price offers have been raised to relatively high

53. Id.
54. Ali Linan, Several Winter Reports Find Texas Electric Grid Not Ready for Another
Winter Storm (Nov. 23, 2021), https://www.cnhinews.com/cnhi/article_51891488-4c9411ec-8bda-d3ac5e45aa8e.html.
55. King et al., supra note 42, at 88.
56. Id.; see also infra Part II.0 (explaining ERCOT’s tactic in raising compensation to
incentivize generation of electricity).
57. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
58. King et al., supra note 42, at 88.
59. Id. Other “energy only” markets include electricity markets in Alberta and Australia.
Id. n.186; Michael Goggin, Capacity Markets: The Way of the Future or the Way of the
Past?, ENERGY SYS. INTEGRATION GRP. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.esig.energy/capacitymarkets-the-way-of-the-future-or-the-way-of-the-past/ (explaining the differences between
capacity market and energy-only markets).
60. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40; Goggin, supra note 59 (stating that
capacity market payments cover all or some of the fixed costs of building and maintaining
generating resources).
61. King et al., supra note 42, at 88.
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levels in hopes of providing sufficient compensation to the generation
sector to incentivize investment during times of peak demand.”62
Consequently, Texas relies on generators to be adequately
incentivized to perform when Texas needs it most. Generators receive
no compensation or credit for having generation capacity when it is not
required on the grid, making their functionality a gamble. 63 The use of
scarcity pricing of wholesale electricity makes it possible for the
availability of supply to appear attractive to generators.64 When demand
is high, the price increases significantly.65 In theory, this incentivizes
generators to make short-term investments to ensure their facilities are
up and running during peak demands but also long-term investments in
plants that can become available during these times when prices are sky
high to capitalize on the energy scarcity. 66 This method of using
scarcity pricing also favors intermittent sources of electricity like wind
and solar which would struggle to compete in a market that values a
guarantee of available supply at any given time.67 Theoretically, if
renewable sources are available in Texas, they can compete in the
market and profit on the inflated pricing
The price of electricity varies typically between thirty dollars and
fifty dollars per megawatt-hour on an average day. Designed to increase
power generation to meet supply, the wholesale electricity price went
up to a number way beyond that. In fact, the pricing was set at the cap
of $9,000 per megawatt-hour during the storm.68 While the inflated
price lasted for multiple days, the result was that providers spent more
money on wholesale electricity in a week than would typically be spent

62. Id. at 15, 88; Goggin, supra note 59 (Texas relies on energy market price spikes
during periods of shortage to cover the fixed costs).
63. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
64. King et al., supra note 42, at 88 (stating that the price offer cap has increased almost
10-fold over a span of 13 years).
65. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
66. Id.
67. Id.; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., shttps://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/?id=electricity
(last visited Dec. 10, 2021) (defining firm capacity as the amount of energy available for
production must be guaranteed to be available at a given time); Goggin, supra note 59
(noting that experts are debating the role of capacity markets as the generation mix evolves,
incorporating more renewable resources).
68. Erin Douglas & Mitchell Ferman, Texas Legislature Close to Approving Billions to
Pay for Winter Storm Financial Fallout, TEX. TRIB. (May 25, 2021), https://www.
texastribune.org/2021/05/25/electricity-market-financing-winter-storm/.
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in four years. 69 That price includes the extreme load shedding that
occurred but doesn’t include the inflated prices that some utilities had
to pay for natural gas. 70
Luckily, most ratepayers won’t see those massive costs⎯and if they
do, it won’t be right away. 71 A majority of Texas ratepayers are
shielded from the dips and swings of the wholesale price because most
retail providers offer a fixed rate for electricity to their customers. 72 The
providers “bear the dips and swings of the wholesale price by using
various financial tools and long-term contracts to try and hedge against
the extreme volatility.”73 However, the prudent planning of such
providers did not prove efficient in an event like Winter Storm Uri—as
evidenced by the amount of energy providers filing for bankruptcy
protection after the bill came due. 74
Other retail energy providers use a different strategy. They do so by
passing the risk on to their customers with direct access to wholesale
energy rates for a monthly fee. 75 As opposed to the fixed price model
that enables a customer to lock in a set rate per kilowatt hour (kWh) for
the generation portion of their electricity bill, the index price model is
tied to market rates. 76 Thus, a consumer’s monthly bill varies based on
both the individual’s consumption and potentially the high wholesale
market rate. 77 Conversely, under a fixed price model, a consumer’s
monthly bill can vary based on the individual’s consumption but the
rate remains constant despite price spikes in the market. 78 The idea of
the index price model is that some users may prefer to manage their
69. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
70. Id.; see Kevin Crowley, Gas Sellers Made $11 Billion While Millions of Texans
Were Without Power in February, FORTUNE (July 9, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/
07/09/gas-sellers-made-11-billion-texas-winter-blackout/ (stating that the cost of gas for
power generation alone was about $8.1 billion).
71. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40; Ali Linan, Texas Regulator Approves
Blueprint for Energy Market Redesign (Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.itemonline.com/
news/texas-regulator-approves-blueprint-for-energy-market-redesign/article_a7e2b99a-0f9c5dfe-87fb-a8fec808ba08.html (“Texans with fixed-rate plans likely did not see higher rates
immediately but are subject to increases in the future.”).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See DIRECT ENERGY PRICING, https://business.directenergy.com/understandingenergy-pricing (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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own demand, cutting back on electricity usage when rates are high and
shifting usage to times when rates are low. 79 But “many of those
consumers were misled or misunderstood the incredible volatility of the
wholesale energy market to which they were being exposed”⎯resulting
in residential energy bills in the thousands of dollars. 80 In either
circumstance, energy providers and ratepayers are facing unreasonably
high prices due to the wholesale pricing inflation.
C. Timeline of Events Related to Winter Storm Uri
Significant facts display the unprecedented nature of Winter Storm
Uri: first, it was frigid. 81 A large portion of the southern U.S. had
average temperatures “more than twenty-five degrees Fahrenheit below
normal.”82 All-time low-temperature records were set in many cities.83
Second, it was not just a local event— all 254 Texas counties were on
emergency weather warnings, and many suffered extended outages of
electricity and water. 84 Finally, the duration of frigid temperatures was
long—large portions of the state were below freezing for more than
seven successive days. 85
The whole week before the storm had already put most of Texas
under stress. But as the weekend approached and things got worse, the
forecasts started to make clear that the next week would not provide
any relief for the ongoing disaster.86 On February 8, there were very
79. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
80. Id.
81. Erin Douglas et al., Texas Leaders Failed to Heed Warnings That Left the State’s
Power Grid Vulnerable to Winter Extremes, Experts Say, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/17/texas-power-grid-failures/.
82. Theresa Machemer, How Winter Storm Uri Impacted the United States,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/howwinter-storm-uri-has-impacted-us-180977055/.
83. Id.
84. CBSDFW.COM, Entire State of Texas Under Winter Storm Warning, Federal
Emergency Declaration Approved (Feb. 14, 2021), https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2021/02/14/
entire-state-of-texas-under-winter-storm-warning/.
85. Andrew Freedman et al., Frigid, Icy Weather Plague Central and Eastern U.S.
While Millions in Texas Remain in the Dark, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/02/16/winter-storm-live-updates/.
86. King et al., supra note 42, at 23 (“The forecast available to ERCOT on February 8
anticipated a low in North Central Texas of 20.5 [degrees Fahrenheit] at 4:00 a.m. on
February 14, for the entire week of the winter event . . . The data for South Central Texas
show a similar pattern. The February 8 forecast showed a low of 26 [degrees Fahrenheit] at
4:00 a.m. on February 14, for the entire week of the winter event.”).
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high expected electrical demands and notices of extreme weather. 87
“ERCOT delayed or canceled approval for a large number of scheduled
outages to make sure as much electrical infrastructure as possible
would be in service in anticipation of the storm.”88 ERCOT prioritized
the natural gas sector by working with the Texas Railroad
Commission 89 ERCOT also allowed power plants “to temporarily
exceed their emission limits from the EPA during peak needs for
electricity.”90
Due to the severity of the winter storm, the Texas Governor declared a
state of emergency due.91 Just one day after the declaration, large generators
began to unexpectedly go offline.92 On Sunday, February 14, ERCOT
issued a public appeal for energy conservation.93 They also were on watch
regarding power supply shortages.94 These outages were made up of
about one-half wind power and one-half natural gas generators. 95
During the late hours of February 14, electricity demand was approaching
available generation.96 “Despite known lack of capacity, as nighttime
approached on Sunday, Texas hit an all-time winter peak electrical
demand of nearly 70,000 MW.”97 The Texas grid surprisingly met that
demand.98 The previous demand on the Texas grid was 66,000 MW.99
Many individuals had no choice but to run their heaters to stay warm
during the unprecedented times.100 As the evening continued, and
demand continued to increase, it became clear that the hope of

87. Id. at 18−20.
88. Id. Approximately 6,630 MW of thermal generation were offline for planned
maintenance. Id. at 24.
89. Id. at 50.
90. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
91. See Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas, https://gov.texas.gov/
uploads/files/press/DISASTER_severe_weather_FINAL_02-12-2021.pdf; King et al., supra
note 42, at 20.
92. King et el., supra note 42, at 25.
93. Id.
94. Id. Texas started with about 1/4th of its total electrical capacity out of service,
mainly due to weather the week before. Id. at 8.
95. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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continuing to meet a rising demand was unlikely and the grid was not
going to be able to keep up.101
1. A Call for Lost Capacity
After warnings were issued that supply was low, generation facilities
started to trip offline, reducing the faith that the resources available
would meet the high demand. 102 Texas has a diverse portfolio of power
generators. 103 One of the largest resource Texas relies on is natural
gas—making up about half of the capacity. 104 The second largest
resource Texas relies on is wind turbines. 105 The remaining resources
that Texas relies on consists of “coal-powered plants, nuclear plants,
and solar farms.”106 Wind and natural gas made up most of the lost
capacity. 107 Cold temperatures make natural gas particularly
vulnerable.108 “Not only does a gas stream contain water vapor that can
freeze by itself, that water vapor can also combine with hydrocarbons
to create hydrates that solidify at temperatures well above freezing.”109
Thus, it was nearly impossible for some gas suppliers to keep supply
levels adequate. 110 Aside from those issues, facilities faced issues
presented by the wholesale pricing rate.
The wholesale price of natural gas during the storm “skyrocketed to
more than 100 times its regular price.”111 At that price, it was nearly
impossible to deliver gas to customers.112 Even if the effort being made
was enough, generators couldn’t afford given the extremely high cost of
fuel.113 But it was not just gas power plants that are to blame.114 Wind
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Norton, supra note 3.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see also Erin Douglas & Ross Ramsey, No, Frozen Wind Turbines Aren’t the
Main Culprit for Texas’ Power Outages, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.
texastribune.org/2021/02/16/texas-wind-turbines-frozen/.
108. Douglas & Ferman, supra note 68.
109. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
110. Id.; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Cost of Transporting Coal to Power Plants Rose
Almost 50% in Decade (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
cfm?id=8830.
111. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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turbines faced troubles—shutting down due to icing. 115 In addition,
solar panels remained challenged as the Winter Storm left panels
covered in snow. 116 “Overall, the entire system was proved ill-prepared
for a storm of this magnitude.”117
To help alleviate some of the supply issues Texas faces, Texas has a
few connections to other power grids. 118 However, those grids that
Texas could rely on did not have much electricity to spare because of
the weather conditions effecting their own facilities. 119 With most
generators going offline when Texas needed them most, Texas had
nearly half of its total supply gone during the coldest event in Texas’s
history.120
2. ERCOT’s Solution: Load Curtailment
The ERCOT system frequency reached “a low of 59.302 Hz at roughly
2:00 AM on February 15, 2021.”121 ERCOT had only one option left to
keep supply and demand simultaneously matched: shed load. 122 “This
process requires turning off parts of the power grid by disconnecting
customers to reduce total demands on the system. This functions by
ERCOT telling the transmission operators X-amount of megawatts need
to be taken off the grid.”123 Entities that are particularly relevant to the
health and safety of individuals, like hospitals, are prioritized when
ERCOT proceeds with the process of shedding load.124 Other circuits

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Kate Galbraith, Texplainer: Why Does Texas Have Its Own Power Grid?, TEX.
TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2011/02/08/texplainer-why-does-texashave-its-own-power-grid/ (explaining the history behind the Texas power grid); Matt
Simon, Texas' Icy Disaster Makes the Case for Uniting the US Grid, WIRED (Feb. 25,
2021), https://www.wired.com/story/texas-disaster-makes-the-case-for-uniting-thegrid/.
119. See Jeremy Schwartz et al., “Power companies get exactly what they want”: How
Texas Repeatedly Failed to Protect its Power Grid Against Extreme Weather, TEX. TRIB.
(Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/22/texas-power-grid-extremeweather/.
120. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Texas natural gas production fell by almost half during
recent cold snap, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46896 (last visited Dec.
10, 2021).
121. King et al., supra note 42, at 26.
122. See id. at 8.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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are shut off in a rolling manner. 125 That way, there is less of an
inconvenience and the 15-30 minute rolling intervals of lost power. 126
The frequency of the Texas power grid became more vulnerable as
time went on.127 “ERCOT continued ordering additional load to be shed
from the system, trying to keep up with the rising demand from the cold
weather and the quickly failing supply.”128 Roughly 30 gigawatts of
thermal power plant⎯which includes gas, coal, and nuclear⎯were
offline. 129 ERCOT’s winter demand was significant, so the “scale of the
loss was devastating.”130 When the frequency fell below the threshold
for grid stability, the whole system was in jeopardy. 131 “Power plant
controls are set to automatically disconnect if the frequency stays below
59.4 Hz for more than nine minutes.”132 To prevent such events from
occurring, ERCOT ordered X amount of MW of load to be shed,
relieving the exceeding demand.133 The problem with the solution is
that the amount of MW that ERCOT ordered to be shed was a
significant amount. In fact, the amount MW shed was the equivalent of
turning off half of Texas today.134 The load shed orders lasted for three
days straight. 135 Thus, “what should have been rolling outages couldn’t
roll” because there was no more to effectively turn off. 136 The result
was that millions of Texans were left without power or heat for days on
end.137

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Richard Axelbaum & Phillip Irace, WashU Expert: ERCOT to Blame for the
Texas blackouts, Not Renewables or Fossil Fuels (Mar. 19, 2021), https://source.wustl.edu/
2021/03/washu-expert-ercot-to-blame-for-texas-blackouts-not-renewables-or-fossil-fuels/.
128. King et al., supra note 42, at 8.
129. Id. at 26
130. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
131. Id.
132. King et al., supra note 42, at 26. ERCOT begins various contingency plans such as
calling on reserves and shedding load, and at low enough frequencies, automated load shed
can occur. Id. ERCOT makes other non-automated (by engineering devices) decisions to
trigger actions to stabilize the grid before grid frequency reaches 59.3 Hz (e.g., call on
responsive reserve and non-spinning reserve capacity). Id.
133. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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Texas was minutes away from a complete grid collapse. 138 “Absent
load shed, ERCOT back casted demand to peak at roughly 76,800 MW,
about 19,120 MW higher than the value expected under normal winter
weather (57,699 MW) and more than 9,500 MW higher than ERCOT’s
‘Extreme Peak Load.’”139 With this amount of demand on the system,
Texas might still be without power months later if the urgent action to
continue shedding load from the system was not promptly initiated.140 If
ERCOT did not continue to order additional load to be shed, shutting
off more and more electricity for Texans, Texas would have faced a
complete collapse of the power grid or a “black start.” 141 Not only is
recovering from a black start an “immense technical challenge[,]” but
equipment would also likely be damaged.142 Suppose Texas needed to
recover from a black start; bringing the system back online would be a
very tedious operation. 143 In that case, Texas could only begin bringing
generators and customers online slowly. In doing so, the grid would
have to maintain the perfect balance between supply and demand
throughout the entire process of starting over.144 If not, and frequency
deviates too far, breakers will trip to protect its equipment, and Texas
would be in the same place from where it began. 145
3. Historical Reluctance
In both 1989 and 2011 similar problems were triggered. In 2011, there
were calls for the Texas grid to winterize its power generation and upstream
production assets (e.g., natural gas wellheads may freeze during winter
events, preventing supply to natural gas fired power plants, and wind
turbines may be unable to operate during freezing weather).146 That
winterization/weatherization did not occur.147
138. Katherine Blunt & Russell Gold, Texas Power Grid Was Minutes from Collapse
During Freeze, Operator Says, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
texaspower-grid-was-minutes-from-collapse-during-freeze-operator-says-11614202063.
139. King et al., supra note 40, at 26.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 9.
142. Black Start, NREL, https://www.nrel.gov/grid/black-start.html (last visited Dec. 10,
2021).
143. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
144. King et al., supra note 42,. at 26−27, 31.
145. PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
146. See Mose Buchele, Texas Lawmakers Passed Changes to Prevent Blackouts.
Experts Say They're Not Enough, NPR (Jun. 2, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/02/
1002277720/texas-lawmakers-passed-changes-to-prevent-moreblackouts-experts-say-its-
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While all the winter events triggered power outages, many circumstances
make Winter Storm Uri different.148 Texas now relies less on coal and more
upon renewable energy resources.149 It is undeniable that the extent and
duration of the outages were far more significant in 2021, and the previous
events were not linked to any loss of life; however, the generation fleet has
changed significantly.150
D. The Legislative Response
From many of the lessons learned, it was evident that “too many Texans
were left without heat or power for days on end.”151 Therefore, the
legislative response in the 87th session is purported to improve the
reliability of the electric grid and help ensure another Winter Storm Uri
does not occur.152 Numerous bills were filed in the Legislature attempting
to identify and address the causes of the market failure.153 After taking
testimony from market stakeholders and individuals impacted by the storm,
three general categories comprise the causes identified by the Legislature.154
First, neither the generation sector nor the natural gas production are
designed to operate in the conditions presented by Uri.155 Second, there was
communication breakdown across the relevant sectors, and ERCOT gave
conflicting signals.156 Third, there were not sufficient dispatchable

not-eno; see Kelsey Vlamis, Texas Was Warned to Winterize Power Plants⎯But Many Still
Froze in the Latest Storms, YAHOO!NEWS (Feb. 19, 2021), https://news.yahoo.com/extremecold-events-1989-2011-051906264.html (finding that the 2011 event was not without
precedent and more than two dozen of the generators that failed in 1989 failed again in
2011).
147. Id.; Vlamis, supra note 146 (“While power generators and natural gas producers
implemented some winterizing procedures, ‘the poor performance’ of many of them
‘suggests that these procedures were either inadequate or were not adequately followed.’”).
148. See King et al., supra note 42, at 73.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Christina Aguayo, Gov. Greg Abbott on Texas Power Grid “I can guarantee the
lights will stay on” (Nov. 28, 2021), https://www.kxan.com/news/gov-greg-abbott-on-texaspower-grid-i-can-guarantee-the-lights-will-stay-on/?ipid=promo-link-block1.
152. See id.
153. See Dane McKaughan, The 87th Session: Public Utility Law, 84 TEX. B. J. 735
(2021) (summarizing SB 2, which primarily addresses ERCOT board governance, and SB 3,
which calls for facility weatherization upgrades).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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generation sources where the generator could be turned off or on rather than
relying on external environmental factors.157
SB 3 attempts to accumulate all the lessons learned by focusing on the
identified issues from both consumer and generator aspects. SB 3 requires
certain power generators to “implement measures to prepare to operate
during a weather emergency.”158 Part of this preparation has been debated
to include requirements for facilities to weatherize its equipment.159 Noncompliance could “result in fines up to $1 million per day.”160Additionally,
SB 3 addressed the need for more reliable generation to increase supply and
insulate that supply from external environmental factors.161 However, the
type of generation needed is not specified.162 More specifically, SB 3 does
not require the construction of any new gas-fired generation. Instead, the
bill directs the PUC to establish requirements to meet the reliability needs
of the ERCOT region and, at least annually, determine the quantity and
characteristics of reliability or ancillary services necessary to meet extreme
heat and extremely cold weather conditions.163 Exactly how the PUC should
go about this, SB 3 does not say.164
Whether it's possible for the PUC to follow this legislation without
additional guidance or interference is currently debated among critics.165 As
stated previously, the PUC has been tasked with managing ERCOT.166
Because ERCOT answers to a different regulating agency from other grid
operators, its rules and regulations come from the Texas Legislature rather

157. Id.
158. Deanna R. Reitman and Jeffrey Bourdon, Winter Storm Uri: New Texas Legislation
Aims to Improve Power Grid, Restructure the Grid’s Overseeing Agency (June 15, 2021),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2021/06/winter-storm-uri-new-texaslegislation-aims-to-improve-power-grid/.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Senate Bill 3 also requires winterization of power systems, which is something
even critics of the legislative response say is much needed. Erin Douglas & Mitchell
Ferman, Texas Legislature approves bills to require power plants to “weatherize,” among
other measures to overhaul electric grid, TEX. TRIB. (May 26, 2021), https://www.
texastribune.org/2021/05/26/texas-power-grid-reform-legislature/.
162. McKaughan, supra note 153, at 736.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Catherine Morehouse, Congress, Texas Should ‘Rethink’ ERCOT’s ‘Go It Alone
Approach’:FERC Chair Glick, UTILITY DRIVE (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/congress-texas-should-rethink-ercots-go-it-alone-approach-ferc-chair/595335/.
166. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss4/4

2022]

Houston, We Have a Market Design Problem

883

than the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).167 In a sense,
Texas operates alone, responding only to its respective regulatory
agencies.168 The Texas Legislature enacted the Public Utility Regulatory
Act and created the Public Utility Commission of Texas.169 At present,
ERCOT and electric utilities answer to the PUC, whose board is appointed
by the Governor.170 Thus, all entities that controlled the operations of
Winter Storm Uri answer to the Texas Legislature, who can take as little or
as much action in regulating the system through laws.171 Despite this power,
lawmakers and regulators have been reluctant to consider significant
changes to address reliability issues with the grid.172
Governor Greg Abbott changed this historical reluctance when he issued
a directive letter on July 6, 2021 after the events of Winter Storm Uri.173
The letter discussed improving incentives to develop reliable fossil fuel and
nuclear generation and requirements of specific generators to shoulder
reliability costs when they cannot guarantee their availability.174 While
these proposals provide some direction for the design of the market, Texas
regulators and lawmakers have known about the grid's vulnerabilities for
years.175 Still, they seemed to have prioritized a less involved approach,
creating significant doubt that change can occur without concrete grid
reform. The FERC has no role in deciding whether ERCOT maintains the
current model or moves under FERC jurisdiction. Some believe that federal
regulation could certainly enhance reliability.176 However, additional state
regulation could be just as efficient for improving reliability in Texas while
maintaining an independent approach.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., supra note 28 (responsibilities include providing
statewide regulation of the rates and services of electric and telecommunications utilities)
170. Darla Cameron et al., How Texas’ Power Grid Works, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/25/texas-power-grid-ercot-puc-greg-abbott/.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Brent Bennett, Improving the ERCOT Grid through a reliability requirement for
variable generation 11 (Oct. 2021), https://www.texaspolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/
10/LP-ImprovingReliabilityofERCOTGrid-10-18-21-BrentBennett-FINAL.pdf.
174. Id. at 10.
175. See generally Cameron et al., supra note 170.
176. Id.
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III. The Complex Interconnection of Production and Generation Requires
Addressing Resiliency Efforts in a Concrete Manner
Winter Storm Uri revealed the cascading failures of energy production,
generation, transmission, and regulation.177 In the storm's aftermath,
citizens and policymakers demanded transformation, and the Texas
Legislature was tasked with pinpointing who was to blame.178 Many
pointed out that generators had failed to weatherize their facilities leading
to the anticipated downfall of ill-prepared equipment.179 Others insisted that
the intentional disconnect from the other power grids in the United States is
untenable in an era of climate change and increased demand for power on
aging infrastructure.180 Lastly and most persuasively, some argued that the
storm was the cause of misaligned market incentives that inevitably result
in such tragedies.181
It is plausible that the allocation of fault cannot be attributed to one sole
cause, but despite an overwhelming number of fixable circumstances, it is
not enough for the Texas Legislature to focus on remedies that only protect
against extreme weather risks.182 For instance, weatherization is partly to
blame for Winter Storm Uri, however, it is neither prudent nor possible to
manage against the risks of a future Winter Storm Uri.183 The
weatherization part of SB 3 allows the Texas Railroad Commission to set
weatherization requirements for facilities to protect them from future cold
spells.184 Not only is compliance with the bill likely to take time as there are
hundreds of power plants, but there are also questions of whether
participants will be willing to pay for the winterization measures for a once-

177. See Isabella Zou, Texas Power Generation Companies Will Have To Better Prepare
For Extreme Weather Under Bills Gov. Greg Abbott Signed Into Law, TEX. TRIB. (June 8,
2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/06/08/greg-abbott-texas-power-grid-ercot.
178. Id.
179. See Buchele, supra note 146.
180. Galbraith, supra note 118.
181. Christopher Hooks, Who’s Responsible for the Texas Blackouts?, TEX. MONTHLY
(Apr. 2021), https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/responsible-texas-blackouts/; see
also Will Englund, The Texas Grid Got Crushed Because Its Operators Didn’t See the
Need to Prepare for Cold Weather, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/2021/02/16/ercot-texas-electric-grid-failure/.
182. Bennett, supra note 15.
183. Id.
184. Scott Friedman, Texas PUC Requires Power Plants Fix Issues Related to Winter
Outages, NBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.nbcdfw.com/investigations/texas-pucrequires-power-plants-fix-issues-related-to-winter-outages/2779286/.
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in-a-decade spell.185 After a similar storm in 2011, generators were
encouraged to winterize their power generation and upstream production
assets (e.g., natural gas wellheads may freeze during winter events,
preventing supply to natural gas-fired power plants and wind turbines may
be unable to operate during freezing weather).186 Facilities were urged to
independently safeguard the ill-prepared equipment against the next big
winter storm.187 While it is reasonable to expect some blackouts and power
plant failures during extreme weather, the aftermath of the 2011 storm
prompted critics to demand otherwise.188 The demand for weatherization
faced strong opposition because generators received no payment to offset
the costs.189 Now, facilities possess the same resistance but are dealing with
legislation mandating compliance.190 To mitigate some of this resistance,
the Texas Railroad Commission has been given the authority to enforce
penalties for those facilities that refuse to comply.191 However, even with
additional measures taken to bolster the success of the Legislature’s efforts,
there is still significant doubt that penalties alone may not be enough to
break an unwavering opposition if the fines alone cost less than the price of
complying with the law.192
185. Englund, supra note 181; Mitchell Ferman, “People Should Probably be Worried”:
Texas Hasn’t Done Enough to Prevent Another Winter Blackout, Experts Say, TEX. TRIBUNE
(Nov. 29, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/11/29/texas-power-grid-winter-storm/
(“Texas’ grid remains vulnerable, largely because newly written regulations allowed too
much wiggle room for companies to avoid weatherization improvements that can take
months or years.”).
186. Monika U. Ehrman, Reimaging Energy, 74 VAND. L. REV. 489, 494 (2021).
187. Shawn Mulcahy, Texas' Natural Gas and Power Generators Would Have to
Prepare for Extreme Temperatures under Bill Senate Committee Approved, TEX. TRIB. (Mar.
25, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/03/25/texas-power-generators-weatherizationlegislature/.
188. King et al., supra note 42, at 72−73 (stating that the Texas Legislature passed a law
that merely required the PUC to analyze the preparedness of power plants of extreme
weather events).
189. Id. (finding that the law 2011 law does not explicitly require annual weatherization
reports and to date, only one report has been filed).
190. See Friedman, supra note 184.
191. Id.
192. See Buchele, supra note 146; see also Bob Sechler, Texas Utility Regulators
Approve Plain Aimed at Boosting Power Grid’s Reliability Over Time, AUSTIN AMERICAN
STATESMAN (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.statesman.com/story/business/2021/12/16/texasplans-boost-electric-grid-reliability-after-winter-storm-power-outages/8928065002/ (stating
that in the rollout of the Weatherization requirements of SB 3, “nearly 30% [of facilities]—
asserted a "good cause for non-compliance" with some part of the winterization rules”).
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The event's media narrative pointed its finger at the “12 GW of power
plant outages related to the weather and the 6 GW caused by gas
shortages,” resulting in naïve legislation remedying weather-based issues.193
But requiring generators to shield valves and wrap electrical cables with
rubber insulation will not ease policymakers’ liability if the primary reason
for the breakdown was not ill-prepared equipment. Oklahoma, a
neighboring state that faced similar issues, points out that coal bailed it out
when faced with the challenging circumstances of Winter Storm Uri.194
Ironically, the coal fleet had minimal winterization issues not caused by
frequency variation⎯necessitating a closer look into the blame game
occurring in Texas.195 During the storm, ERCOT was in such desperate
mode that Texas had significant variation in frequency, causing plants to
trip offline and disturb the system.196
Given the comparison between Texas and a neighboring state, it is likely
that frequency deviation was to blame in Texas, just as much as it was in
Oklahoma. More alarming in this realization is that the legislation did not
remedy this finding, making the legislative response insufficient to protect
facilities from future blackouts in winter and summer. It is predicted that
Texas’s summer demand will pose issues because the demand is not
decreasing. In fact, the summer demand will reach or exceed the levels of
193. Brent Bennett, Responding to the Texas Blackouts: SB3 is just the First Step on a
Long Road Toward Reform, THE DAILY CANNON (May 27, 2021), https://thecannon
online.com/responding-to-the-texas-blackouts-sb-3-is-just-the-first-step-on-a-long-roadtoward-reform/.
194. Kevin Stitt (@Stitt4Gov), TWITTER (June 7, 2021, 1:15 PM), https://twitter.com/
Stitt4Gov/status/1401965932952629252?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw; OK ENERGY TODAY (Feb.
16, 2021), http://www.okenergytoday.com/2021/02/gov-stitt-on-blackouts-thank-goodnessfor-coal/.
195. See id. Mostly coal and natural gas generators listed frequency issues as the reason
for tripping offline during the winter event. King et al., supra note 42, at 26. Even though,
according to ERCOT protocols, the frequency deviation shouldn’t have tripped any underfrequency relays that automatically disconnect the power plant from the grid to protect itself
physically. Id. However, rapid increases in exhaust and boiler pressures occurred at some
power plants from equipment responding to grid frequency changes. Id. Those fluctuating
power plant conditions, in turn, tripped other safety mechanisms that took generators offline.
Id.
196. Catherine Traywick et al., The Two Hours That Nearly Destroyed Texas’s Electric
Grid, BLOOMBERG GREEN (Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/202102-20/texas-blackout-how-the-electrical-grid-failed; Matt Largey, Texas' Power Grid Was 4
Minutes and 37 Seconds Away from Collapsing. Here's How It Happened, TEX. STANDARD
(Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/texas-power-grid-was-4-minutes-and37-seconds-awayfrom-collapsing-heres-how-it-happened/.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss4/4

2022]

Houston, We Have a Market Design Problem

887

Winter Storm Uri every year from now on.197 Therefore, the volatility in
supply and demand levels causing frequency deviations will persist and will
not be cured by the legislative response in SB 3. It is unfortunate that Texas
did not have the resource of coal to fall back on to remedy the
circumstances during the storm; however, Texas does have a neighboring
state to look to when understanding the future effectiveness of the
legislation.
Some critics have gone so far as to argue that looking to other states for
understanding is insufficient, and dependency must come from the ability to
connect to other grids when in need of power.198 But neither the eastern nor
the western half of the national grid would have let Texas borrow large
amounts of power when facing Winter Storm Uri.199 “Texas would have
had to fall back on a neighbor that was far enough away so as to not also be
suffering from similar extreme circumstance.”200 Many of those states were
also dealing with their own high energy demand and generation issues. 201
Additionally, while the eastern and western interconnection exchange
power on the local level, there are no high-voltage lines to connect the
grids, which leaves the question of who will bear those extremely expensive
build-out costs.202
Given that Texas has its own grid, it is apparent that the state must rely
on its own method and resources. To combat the reluctance of generators,
the inconsistent findings in the aftermath, and the impracticability of
relying on other grids, state interference is necessary.203 To accomplish this
task, the Legislature should address Texas’s dependency on its natural gas
backbone and focus on the root problem brought to light by Winter Storm
Uri⎯misaligned market incentives.
A. Evaluating Market Incentives to Improve Fuel Security
Texas never had enough reliable capacity to make it through Winter
Storm Uri without blackouts.204 Even if electricity generators had been
197. Bennett, supra note 193.
198. Simon, supra note 118. But see Melissa Lott, Building a ‘Green Star State’ (Dec.
10, 2010), https://cockrell.utexas.edu/news/archive/6776-greenstarstate (asserting that if
other states had a chance to set up their grid where it had control over a majority of the
state’s electrical demand, they would choose the independence Texas has).
199. Simon, supra note 118.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See generally Bennett, supra note 193.
204. Bennet, supra note 15.
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operating at the same level of reliability that they do during the peak days,
blackouts were still inevitable.205 It has become apparent that Texas’s
electricity demand is growing, but the supply of reliable thermal generation
is not.206 Thus, lawmakers must first address why supply fails to keep up
with rising demand.207 Pointing at management and technical errors rather
than policy choices that favored one generation over the other avoids the
root cause of Winter Storm Uri and future blackouts.208 Poor real-time
decisions most definitely heightened some of the issues; however, “these
long-term policies left the grid vulnerable to any event combining high
demand with low wind and solar output.”209
In SB 3, the Legislature correctly recognized that ERCOT needs to
control the generation of electricity by having additional resources to
dispatch in the event of high demand and low supply levels.210 However,
SB 3 does not itself require the construction of needed generation, nor does
the legislation guarantee the supply level will be adequate.211 Instead, the
bill directs the PUC to ensure that ERCOT periodically “determines the
quantity and characteristics of ancillary or reliability services necessary
during extreme heat and cold weather conditions and during times of low
non-dispatchable power production.”212 The problem with this solution is
that the legislation intends to create a different result during times of need;
that is, an availability of resources despite any change in the market design.
The PUC is expected, not required, to somehow ensure with some degree of
certainty that market participants will show up in the market as it stands. If
that logic was promising, additional firm generation would have presented
itself during Winter Storm Uri.
To guarantee availability, dependable assets must be available.213 One
might find that there is a simple solution⎯build more generation plants.214
However, with the current model, the unfair advantages between renewable
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 193.
207. See id.
208. Bennett, supra note 7.
209. Id.
210. McKaughan, supra note 153, at 736.
211. Id.; see also infra Part II. 0 (discussing what type of generation is needed).
212. Brooksany Barrowes et al., Texas Adopts Legislation to Better Prepare Energy
Market for Extreme Weather (June 14, 2021), https://www.kirkland.com/publications/blogpost/2021/06/texas-extreme-weather-energy-market-legislation.
213. See infra Part II.0 (discussing the benefits of thermal generation over renewable
generation when evaluating dependency)
214. See Bennett, supra note 193.
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and non-renewable energy generators create a high likelihood of absence
from the generation sought.215 These generators are not necessarily to blame
because, as the market stands, if a generator were to add an investment to
the Texas electricity grid, it almost invites financial hardship. Building
additional generation facilities effectively guarantees that the price stays
low even though the demand continues to increase.216 In other words,
players on the bench aren’t being paid unless they play, so they are bidding
to play for less and less just to be able to operate.217 Consequently, Texas
generators face economic challenges that have resulted in the retirement of
facilities and a lack of investment in new facilities.218 To put the issue in
perspective, over the last ten years in Texas, the revenues collected by the
generators were less than the cost of providing the electricity⎯creating
more and more bench players unable to enter the game.219
If there are not reliable incentives to build enough generators or pay
maintenance costs, “it is not simply a problem of how the market works—it
is a problem of market design, a problem of planning.”220 Market design
problems have existed in other areas and for various reasons.221 “It
overwhelmed California’s first electricity market during the Western
Energy Crisis in the early 2000s just as much as it mars Texas electricity
markets today.”222 The realistic consequence of poor planning is the
unavailability of resources, which is the dilemma Texas faces today.
ERCOT heavily relies on the scarcity pricing of wholesale electricity with a
shortage price set by the Public Utility Commission to guarantee
availability.223 When demand is high, the price increases significantly.224
215. Id.
216. Bennett, supra note 173, at 11.
217. Ed Hirs, Why the Texas Power Market Failed, YALE INSIGHTS (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/why-the-texas-power-market-failed.
218. Bennett, supra note 7. (“Only 2,186 MW of gas generation was added from 2015 to
2020, compared to 16,197 MW of wind and solar, a number which has grown . . . . Several
thousand MW of coal plants were also retired over that time . . . show[ing] a net loss of
about 1,000 MW in reliable capacity for peak winter demand periods”).
219. Hirs, supra note 217.
220. Georg Rilinger, The Texas Blackouts and the Problems of Electricity Market
Design, PROMARKET (Mar. 24, 2021), https://promarket.org/2021/03/24/texas-blackoutsproblems-electricity-market-design-failure/.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Resmi Surendran, Scarcity Pricing in Ercot (June 27, 2016), https://cms.ferc.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-05/20160629114652-3%2520-%2520FERC2016_Scarcity%2520
Pricing_ERCOT_Resmi%2520Surendran.pdf.
224. See Rilinger, supra note 220.
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The market assumes that the prediction of profit by energy providers will
incentivize generators to be available when the price is inflated.225 In
theory, generators are incentivized to make “short-term investments to
ensure their facilities are up and running during peak demands and longterm investments in plants that can spin up to capitalize on the energy
capacity.”226
Because the system is at peak for only a few hours during the year. Thus,
there is time in which generators are idle while they wait for prices to
skyrocket. Theoretically, ERCOT’s reliance on the unique “crisis-based
model” should have driven extremely high prices during Winter Storm Uri
and, in turn, provided for movement. However, the exact opposite occurred
as many generators struggled to recover costs of lost load and ended up
bankrupt. So, the real inquiry is: why isn’t the incentive structure Texas
relies on building a market that incentivizes generators to build and
maintain generation capacity at the required level of reliability?227 Or in
another light, what is preventing reliable generational capacity from seeing
a return on its investments?
It is difficult not to blame Texas’s own market design when prices
skyrocket, assuming this is what generators have been waiting for but then
nevertheless results in a shortage. This paradox can be attributed to the
distortion of prices by federal subsidies, investors, and municipal utilities
explicitly looking to invest in wind and solar, even at a higher cost.228 For
too long, market distorting subsidies have created a no-lose situation for
renewable generators.229 The benefits these resources receive include
massive tax breaks, special financing arrangements and avoidance of fuel
costs.230 Furthermore, the production tax credit pays renewable generators
225. See PRACTICAL ENGINEERING, supra note 40.
226. Id.
227. See Rilinger, supra note 220.
228. Bennett, supra note 173, at 4; Brent Bennett et al., The Siren Song that Never Ends:
Federal Energy Subsidies and Support from 2010 to 2019, TEX. PUB. POLICY FOUND. (Apr.
23, 2021), https://www.texaspolicy.com/the-siren-song-that-never-ends/.
229. Jason Isaac, Electricity Isn’t on the Special Session Agenda and That’s a Good
Thing (July 16, 2021), https://www.texaspolicy.com/electricity-isnt-on-the-special-sessionagenda-and-thats-a-good-thing/.
230. Id.; Jason Isaac, Texas Blackouts are the Result of Unreliable ‘Green’ Energy (Feb.
19, 2021), https://www.texaspolicy.com/texass-blackouts-are-the-result-of-unreliable-greenenergy/ (“Research by the Texas Public Policy Foundation’s Life:Powered project found
that more than $80 billion of our tax dollars have been spent on wind and solar subsidies in
the last decade, in federal subsidies alone. Texans are also charged an average of $1.5 billion
a year in state subsidies for renewable energy.”).
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to produce electricity whether the grid needs it or not, which most would
probably say is a compelling reason to stay in the game.231 On the other
hand, these incentives and tax credits provide a reason for other generators
not to enter the game.
The prediction of profit by energy providers is the foundation for
ensuring investment in the Texas grid.232 While the incentive to invest in
renewable generation is present and promising, other generators are not as
lucky. Prediction of profit is eliminated for firm generators in the Texas
market because of the policy choices that guarantee renewable resources
revenue, resulting in more and more wind and solar investment.233 Under
this structure, renewable generators do not have to consider meeting
reliability standards, much less at the lowest possible cost. Moreover,
renewable generation continues to grow with no penalty. This growing
presence keeps prices low by decreasing the wholesale electricity prices. It
causes other generators to experience more hours offline and reduces the
incentive to build or maintain any plants in the market. This trend will
likely intensify as renewable capacity grows and makes bolstering
requirements necessary to even the playing field. Now facing policymakers:
statutory reform to counteract the discriminatory practices⎯incentivizing
firm generators to get off the bench and enter the game.
B. Proposed Amendment to SB 3⎯Firming Up Variable Energy Resources
Texas’s lack of grid resilience and integrity was at the forefront of issues
needing to be addressed; however, the substantive reforms passed in the
regular session still lack concrete guidance that can address the fear of a
repetitive cycle. As the market stands, the market redesign that Texas hopes
for is still plagued by two issues: how much backup power is needed to step
up and how to allocate the cost. 234
The worry for Texas has been that better energy efficiency and continued
renewable energy additions will combine with cheap natural gas to keep
electricity prices low, creating severe implications for fuel availability.235
231. Isaac, supra note 229.
232. See Rilinger, supra note 220.
233. Bennett, supra note 173, at 10; see Lott, supra note 198 (“In the past decade, Texas
has installed more renewable energy in the state than it has in the past 100 years, and no one
is talking about⎯Texas is doing it quietly.”).
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Gavin Bade, The Great Capacity Market Debate: Which Model can Best
Handle the Energy Transition?, UTILITY DRIVE (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.
com/news/the-great-capacity-market-debate-which-model-can-best-handle-the-energy-
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Texas is an energy-only market which means that the market obtains a
premium during times of scarcity and the construction of new dispatchable
energy is left for the market to decide.236 The system’s reliance on the
market to show up and produce has led to an increased cost for backup
power and more frequent reliability issues.237 To rely less on the market and
ensure generators spin up during times of need, the Texas market redesign
must be guided in statute with a firming requirement.
“The term ‘firming requirement’ refers to a requirement for variable
generators to guarantee a minimum level of availability.”238 Moreover, if
there is a time a renewable source cannot physically generate or is
incapable of producing what is expected, it must pay to guarantee
production from another source.239 While it may appear harsh to hold
renewable energy sources to a penalty motivated standard, it is necessary to
avoid another event like Winter Storm Uri.
Different types of generators, such as power plants, are not restriction
free.240 Non-renewable generators are required to reduce their pollution
levels to match the advantages offered by wind and solar.241 Thus, wind and
solar should have reliability standards to meet the level of system-level
reliability of coal and gas. To convey these requirements, legislation should
be implemented that mirrors Governor Abbott’s directive letter to the
Public Utility Commission which states, “allocate reliability costs to
generation resources that cannot guarantee their own availability, such as
wind or solar power.”242
tr/440657/; see also Jeff Deyette & Steven Frenkel, Ripe for Retirement, Catalyst: Spring
2013, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/catalyst/sp13-ripefor-retirement.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2021) (analyzing the cost to modernize existing
coal generation by installing pollution controls and comparing the operating cost of the coalfired generator to a natural gas combined-cycle generator or a wind power facility).
236. McKaughan, supra note 153.
237. Bennett, supra note 173, at 11.
238. Isaac, supra note 229.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Letter from Greg Abbott, GOVERNOR OF TEX., to Chairman Peter Lake,
Commissioner Will McAdams, Commissioner Lori Cobos, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX.
(July 6, 2021) (on file with author); Isaac, supra note 229. SB 3 contains some provisions to
give the PUC latitude to address this problem. Sections 13 and 17 require the commission to
establish more clear reliability standards and adjust prices to incentivize more dispatchable
generation. See Bennett, supra note 193. While these sections leave far too much to the
discretion of the PUC, they do offer a clear directive for market reform, the only parts of SB
3 that do. Id.
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As is the case with any proposed legislative change, it is necessary to
balance the pros and cons. There are convincing policies associated with
environmental and sustainability concerns, which serve as colorable
arguments in driving the grid towards more cleaner energy sources. 243 It is
undeniable that these sources provide critical environmental benefits but, in
broadening the lens of perception, a far more vital consideration is how
much more the Texas electric grid can rely on environmentally sound
sources without rendering the system so unstable that it becomes prone to
crashing. If the Texas Legislature were to incorporate a firming requirement
into the text of the statute, the other generators would be re-incentivized
and more inclined to enter the game. In fact, a firming service of just 12%
of installed capacity would incentivize a procurement of 3,473 MW of
power from other sources.244 This major advancement does not come at the
expense of renewable production though⎯charging renewable resources
for their imposed cost may only marginally affect their present incentives
and development⎯allowing Texas to continue supporting and encouraging
renewable source production.245 By creating this incentive, the playing field
becomes more even and, in turn, allows the PUC to believe with a higher
degree of certainty that other generators will show up.246
ERCOT estimates contributions from generators to meet peak demand.247
“Thermal generators contribute more than 90% of their peak output during
peak-demand periods.”248 Conversely, wind and solar generators often
produce far less than their expected output during peak periods.249 When
this happens, the weather-dependent generation is faced with uncertainty,
making load balancing extremely difficult.250 Every year, ERCOT is
required to estimate the expected demand and the capacity available to meet
peak demand.251 The more uncertain resource availability is, the higher the

243. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/statelocalenergy/local-renewableenergy-benefits-and-resources (last visited Dec. 10, 2022).
244. Bennett, supra note 173, at 13.
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 5. (Potomac Economics, 2021, p.84) — found in the text — within the
footnotes.
249. Id. During the summer-demand hours over the previous years, renewables
contributed between 16% and 46% of their aggregate installed capacity, making them up to
10 times more variable than thermal generation. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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required reserve margin.252 However, unlike other markets ERCOT does
not require utilities to meet a required reserve margin.253 Instead, it has a
target reserve margin that informs policymakers on whether reliability is
adequate.254 Thus, in times like Winter Storm Uri, when load balancing is
extremely difficult, the market assumes generators will step up to provide
the backup power needed. When they don’t, Texas ratepayers bear the
transmission and reliability costs.255
The unfortunate reality of the situation is that ratepayers are vulnerable
to high costs in not only the winter, but the summer as well. Winter Storm
Uri may have well been a once-in-a-lifetime event, but Texas will be unable
to rely on the legislation to resolve future reliability issues. There is roughly
76 GW of thermal generation available, which equals a summer peak
demand.256 This demand is growing between 1% and 2% every year in
Texas, relying on wind and solar generation to meet that growth.257
Therefore, it is likely that a substantial portion of capital costs going
towards variable generation will continue to present reliability issues.258
Unless the new market design addresses all seasons where the availability
of reliable supply is an apparent issue, the market will continue to bifurcate
into an expensive system of subsidized back up generation.259
Therefore, the lesson here extends beyond preparing for another Winter
Storm Uri in Texas.260 Other states, such as California, have also faced
severe blackouts, in different extreme weather events.261 Thus, while Texas
is the latest glaring cause of failure, the issue of planning for these type of
extremes is critical for all grid systems in the U.S.262 With a firming
requirement implemented in statute, the legislation will remedy future
issues during all peak times, not just winter.263 Moreover, requiring
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. (finding that ratepayers bear the cost by either subsidizing backup generation or
endure more blackouts).
256. Bennett, supra note 15.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Bennett, supra note 173, at 11.
260. Lili Pike, 3 Ways Texas Could Avoid Another Electricity Crisis, VOX (Feb. 17,
2021), https://www.vox.com/22286974/texas-power-outage-winter-storm-uri-gas-grid-ercotsnow-climate-change.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Bennett, supra note 173, at 11.
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renewable sources to guarantee availability will bring more balance to the
market during all seasons and provide an incentive for generators, thereby
lowering the overall cost to ratepayers. Without it, the market will continue
to be an uneven playing field, resulting in the same outcome that prompted
the discussion.
C. A More Efficient Market Mechanism
Improving fuel security through a firming requirement is most successful
within the proposed market blueprint. As of December 2021, the PUC has
“adopted a two-phase blueprint to address Texas’s wholesale energy market
design.”264 In the restructure, the PUC has correctly focused on keeping
Texas performance-driven.265 Now that commissioners of the PUC have
given ERCOT time to explore concepts and establish plans to achieve
results in the market design, ERCOT has developed a plan to ensure
additional dispatchable energy is available to meet the demands of the
grid.266 Texas will now have fashioned products that power plant operators
will own and qualify for.267 ERCOT will procure a certain percentage of
those types of products, qualifying plant operators to be paid for
performance.268 However, the additional incentives are not system-wide,
instead, the capacity-like payments are limited to only a few power plants.
Thus, SB 3 creates what could be referred to as a Texas-style capacity
market and preserves the performance-driven system.269
264. Linan, supra note 71
265. Isaac, supra note 229; Linan, supra note 71 (statement from PUC commissioner
Lori Cobos) (“The balance that we're trying to strike here today with these rules, and that is
continuing in our commitment to protect residential and small commercial consumers and
maintain a healthy competitive retail market.”);
see also Jason Deign, Flexibility without a Capacity Market: What Texas Can Teach the UK
(June 12, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/flexibility-without-acapacity-market-what-texas-can-teach-the-uk (“Legislators have shown strong support for
the energy-only market that has fueled the diversification of the state's electricity generation
fleet and yielded significant benefits for customers”); see also Walton, supra note 269.
266. Linan, supra note 71
267. See also Walton, supra note 269.
268. Linan, supra note 71 (explaining that mechanisms implemented include “loadserving obligations and dispatchable energy credits that should offer economic rewards and
provide robust penalties or alternative compliance payments based on a resource's ability to
meet established standards”).
269. Robert Walton, California Markets in the Lone Star State? Texas Regulators
Consider 'Quasi-Capacity' Market System, UTILITY DRIVE (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.
utilitydive.com/news/california-markets-in-the-lone-star-state-texas-regulators-considerquasi/608695/.
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System-wide capacity markets are designed to provide incentives for all
generators seeking to enter the market by guaranteeing revenue upfront.270
It does so by incentivizing the building of new plants through the
opportunity to secure revenue years in advance.271 The critical difference is
that, unlike generators in Texas, generators in a capacity market don’t have
to wait and hope that the prices hit $9000/MWh because the generators are
paid to exist.272 By guaranteeing some profit for generators, the competitor
is incentivized per se. Whether these incentives work in application is
controversial and could lead to additional issues.273 Under this scheme, the
PUC and ERCOT would contract with generation resources to be available
at all times of the year.274 But, these resources would only be required to
provide energy only a few hours a year.275 Moreover, aside from those few
hours each year, the generators would face no penalties for nonperformance.276
If Texas were to consider this alternative approach, it would protect the
individual competitors over the competition⎯hampering the new market
design. Though protecting individual competitors seems to be an easy
solution to incentivize new generation, it would set Texas back in three
regards. First, a capacity market would not change the fact that ensuring
incentive structures is still “an elusive and precarious byproduct of a
company’s search for profits.”277 Historically, the electricity industry
fluctuates with “boom-and-bust cycles.”278 The closer the existing capacity
is to peak demand levels, the more generators contemplate an increasingly
dangerous gamble.279 “These considerations show that the margin of error
for electricity market design is very thin” and proves it is “inherently risky
270. Gavin Bade, The Great Capacity Market Debate: Which Model Can Best Handle
the Energy Transition?, UTILITY DRIVE (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/the-great-capacity-market-debate-which-model-can-best-handle-the-energy-tr/440657/.
If Texas were to consider a capacity market style model by protecting competitors instead of
competition, by ensuring some guaranteed revenue, capacity costs could generate higher
power costs for the ratepayer. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Largey, supra note 196.
274. Matt Welch & Landon Stevens, Welfare for Texas Electricity Generators is Not a
Viable Solution (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.conservativeenergynetwork.org/welfare-fortexas-electricity-generators-is-not-a-viable-solution/.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Rilinger, supra note 220.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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to tie the reliability of electrical systems to such an ideal.”280 Even
assuming ideal conditions, the long-term reliability of the system would
depend on the incentive structure and calculations of generators that are
operating in the market.281
To assume that a capacity market would have a different result is wishful
thinking.282 Even if these incentives were geared to the firm capacity that is
needed, the capacity market would drive excess capacity. Actors
undoubtedly need to face the correct incentives.283 However, market
participants in a capacity market would still bet that the system will need
their resources during peak demand and that prices will be high enough to
make the investment worthwhile.284 This calculation is often hard to predict
because of the long lead-times to construct new capacity.285 For example, a
company’s investment might not pay off if too many others also build up
generation.286 Thus, a capacity market design doesn’t change the fact that
“[e]lectricity market design is thus an ambitious project of social
engineering that operates against a thin margin of error.”287
Second, a competitive market should allow customers and generators to
react to real-time conditions to save customers money.288 Today, customers
who purchase energy off the grid can determine whether to consume
electricity from the grid, generate their own electricity, or reduce
consumption based on all relevant factors at the time.289 This also allows
residential customers flexibility to exercise when they want to turn
electricity-consuming products on and off.290 But regulatory obligations
imposed in a capacity market would require customers to pay for electricity

280. Id.
281. Id.; Winter Storm 2021 and the Lifting of COVID-19 Restrictions in Texas, U. HOUS.
HOBBY SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, https://uh.edu/hobby/winter2021/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
282. See Bade, supra note 270.
283. Rilinger, supra note 220.
284. Id.; Goggin, supra note 59 (explaining that capacity markets have some of the
largest surpluses of generating capacity). One might argue that large reserves of generating
capacity are worthwhile to improve electric reliability. Id. However, reports show that
rapidly diminishing returns for excess capacity. see id.
285. Rilinger, supra note 220.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Welch, supra note 274.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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one to three years in advance, squashing flexibility and forcing retail
customers to pay costs that are otherwise avoidable.291
Third, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify the capacity model
considering the current rapid innovation in technologies.292 Capacity
markets might clarify who owns what, but it does not address the planning
and strategy required in dealing with wind and solar.293 Both Texas, an
energy-only market, and California, a capacity market, have faced negative
prices for periods of time.294 Considering Texas is one of the nation’s
renewable energy leaders, it cannot be hampered by a one-size-fits-all
approach. Additionally, capacity markets remain vulnerable to price
depression due to out-of-market subsidies.295 For instance, Connecticut
lawmakers have debated nuclear subsidies to encourage the development of
that resource. Similarly, Massachusetts passed a law mandating additional
GW of offshore wind and hydropower purchases.296 From a market
participant standpoint , “the problem with these mandates and long-term
power purchase agreements is that they give renewables and/or nuclear an
economic leg-up over the other resources that don't get access to those
incentives.”297 This could suppress capacity market revenues for
unsubsidized generators if the subsidized generators play in the market.298
Therefore, capacity markets point to a much bigger issue: how to reconcile
environmental goals that subsidize and encourage more renewable energy
additions with the need to preserve market incentives for unsubsidized
generation.299
The decision to reject central planning models for the Texas grid will
prove more successful in providing long-term incentives for investment in
more unsubsidized generation. Through the creation of such targeted
backstop measures, where providers will compete to perform, the Texas
291. Id.
292. Jonathan Lesser, America’s Electricity Grid: Outdated or Underrated?, THE
HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/americaselectricity-grid-outdated-or-underrated.
293. Id.
294. Bade, supra note 270; MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, Utility of the Future: an MIT
Energy Initiative Response to an Industry in Transition 6 (Dec. 2016),
ttps://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Utility-of-the-Future-Full-Report.pdf.
295. Id.
296. Id. Those concerns have sparked challenges to nuclear subsidy programs and
proposals in New York, Illinois, Connecticut, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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market will protect competition rather than individual competitors.300 As
seen in the pre-Winter Storm Uri market design, protecting individual
competitors can severely jeopardize the reliability of the grid. Like the
functionality of the firming requirement, both measures will be dependent
on Texas keeping a performance-driven focus. With the Texas-capacity
market underway, the Texas market design avoids the severe price spikes
that would otherwise need to occur in energy-only markets to attract
investments but does not eviscerate the competitive retail market.
D. Defining Dispatchable Energy
Winter Storm Uri highlighted many issues with the electric grid; but
fundamentally, it exposed a systemic shortage of reliable capacity.301 It is
worthwhile to look at the value of each ancillary source debated by the
PUC to understand why Texas needs more coal and gas generation.302 It
would be ideal if more transmission from wind and solar could meet the
Texas demand.303 But renewable sources, through no fault of their own, are
"unavailable" or less effective in the sense that they cannot produce more
electricity during peak demand, which makes reliance on them ill-advised
or risky.304 Texas is limited to these resources “when the sun shines or the
wind blows.”305 This also makes renewable resources the precise definition
of non-dispatchable⎯Texas is unable to call on them for assistance when
needed to meet unexpected peaks.306
300. See id.
301. Bennett, supra note 7.
302. See Bennett, supra note 193.
303. Shelby Webb, Wind and Solar Power is Rapidly Growing in Texas, but ERCOT
Limits how much goes on the Grid, HOUS. CHRON. (June 4, 2021), https://www.houston
chronicle.com/business/energy/article/Wind-solar-production-outstrips-transmission-in16223706.php.
304. See Jordan Hanania et al., Intermittent electricity, ENERGY EDUC. (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Intermittent_electricity; Bethel Afework et al., Nondispatchable Source of Electricity, ENERGY EDUC. (Oct. 15, 2021), https://energy
education.ca/encyclopedia/Non-dispatchable_source_of_electricity.
Renewable
energy
sources are intermittent, meaning they are not to be used as a constant source of supply. Id.;
Josh Lederman, Texas Officials Circulated Climate Skeptic’s talking Points on Failures
During Storm, NBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/
texas-officials-circulated-climate-skeptic-s-talking-points-power-failures-n1262700 (stating
there was a lesson to learn from the Texas crisis: that renewable generators are often useless
when you need them most).
305. Lederman, supra note 304.
306. Id. (stating that because renewable sources don’t generate electricity 24 hours a day,
the grid must pull from other sources when the sun isn’t shining, or wind isn’t blowing).
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ERCOT administers day-ahead and real-time markets, as well as a
secondary market, also called the ancillary service market, that allows
procurement of short-term reserves to meet high demand.307 The
procurement of the ancillary service must base its analysis on the amount of
capacity necessary to accommodate both intermittent generation and
reliable backup power.308 Predictive models show that a 50% wind and
solar share for Texas would still require, at a bare minimum, 60 GW of
dispatchable generation and 10 GW of energy storage⎯meaning Texas
must rely even more on natural gas to provide energy during shortages.309
The value of an ancillary resource is different depending on the season it
comes to fuel storage. In the summer, it is not as important to have a few
days or a few weeks’ worth of fuel because the peaks during the summer
are very discrete and do not interrupt fuel supply. Conversely, in the winter,
like the event in Winter Storm Uri and what happened in the winter storm
of 2011, fuel supply can get disrupted, so there presents a need for fuel
storage options (e.g., backup fuel storage at gas plants so they can burn
diesel or fuel oil, or underground gas storage for coal and nuclear plants).310
Texas usually does not have many storage capacity options because the
resource-laden state can easily pull it from the ground when needed.311 But
when production of natural gas in the state has decreased, it is difficult for
power plants to get the fuel needed to operate.312 Natural gas power plants
usually do not have access to fuel storage directly onsite; most of the plants
rely on the flow of natural gas from pipelines all across the state.313 Thus,
all of the existing gas plants that were patiently waiting for the price spike
but, when it did, could not deliver and limit the windfall.314 Thus, even if
gas operators have taken all the necessary precautions to weatherize their
307. King et al., supra note 42, at 88.
308. See generally Bennett, supra note 173.
309. Brent Bennett, Green New Deal Will Put Texans in the Red: Effects on Texas
Electricity Costs and Energy Production up to 2030, TEX. PUB. POLICY FOUND. (Oct. 2019),
https://lifepowered.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2019-08-PP-LP-Bennett-Green-NewDeal.pdf.
310. Id.
311. Erin Douglas, Texas Largely Relies on Natural Gas for Power. It wasn’t Ready for
the Extreme Cold, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/16/
natural-gas-power-storm/.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Julian Spector, Why is the Texas Market so Tough for Energy Storage? (Nov.
19,2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/why-is-the-texas-market-so-toughfor-energy-storage.
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facilities, it won’t be enough to prevent another disaster.315 That is because
Texas has not fixed the critical problem that paralyzed the plants:
maintaining a sufficient supply of natural gas.316
Instead of relying on Texas’s natural gas backbone, renewables could be
paired with battery technology to provide more storage and assistance in
times of need.317 However, the solution can’t displace the need for firm
generation because electricity is still extremely expensive to transport and
store.318 The incredible success of the renewable industry “should, in
theory, create a role for energy storage.”319 However, the wind and solar
advocates abandoning the need for dispatchable generation and claiming
that demand response and battery storage can manage the variability of
renewable resources are 320 But until there is an economic alternative for
long-duration storage, the proposal is a “fantasy borne of statistical models
and academic studies.”321
While technologies are being developed for utility-scale energy storage,
they are all challenged by the immense scale required by the electric grid.322
For Texas to rely solely on renewable resources—resources such as wind
and solar—Texas would need at least a day’s worth of energy storage for
the entire grid.323 Winter Storm Uri would have required 2−4 days’ worth of
storage.324 This challenge inevitably comes with a high cost⎯a day’s worth
of storage capacity would require “building a battery the size of a small
power plant (100 MW/400 MWh) every day between now and 2035, at a [at
the cost of] nearly 100 billion per year.”325 Similarly, demand response can
315. Ferman, supra note 185.
316. Id.
317. Bob Sechler, Texas Utility Regulators Approve Plain Aimed at Boosting Power
Grid’s Reliability Over Time, AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.
statesman.com/story/business/2021/12/16/texas-plans-boost-electric-grid-reliability-afterwinter-storm-power-outages/8928065002/ (statement of PUC Commissioner Lake)
(“[Texas] must do more to ensure sufficient incentives exist to warrant investment in
"reliable sources of power" as well. That could include renewable sources. . . such as wind
or solar if paired with batteries, or energy from biomass or other nonintermittent sources.”).
318. Erin Douglas, Texas Largely Relies on Natural Gas for Power. It Wasn’t Ready for
the Extreme Cold, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/16/
natural-gas-power-storm/.
319. Spector, supra note 314.
320. Bennett, supra note 193.
321. See Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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be a great tool to adjust to sudden drops in electricity supply but is still
limited in the practicality of reliance.326 If Texas were to rely on demand
response, residential and commercial consumers would be burdened with
turning off the electricity to adjust to sudden drops in supply.327 There has
to be a limit of consumers who would be willing and required to turn off
their air conditioning in the hot summer heat, dampening the interest.328
Therefore, until there is an economically viable alternative to long-duration
storage, storage and demand response can help in small ways by shifting
energy but will not suffice as wholly reliable.329
The Texas Legislature has already clearly expressed the desire of Texans
to improve the reliability of the grid.330 This desire can be fulfilled by
evaluating the costs of alternative methods of providing the same response,
which could be, for example, price incentives to shift or reduce demand or
dispatch of extra generation.
IV. Without Concrete Legislation Implemented into Statute, the Texas
Market Design Subjects Itself to External Influence
A. Deferring to Lawmakers Will Provide Security and Protection for
Ratepayers
Market design is a highly political activity, is open to stakeholder
influence, and takes place in bureaucratic processes.331 As such, it is usually
not prioritized by Texas legislators as they end up in a position unable to
enforce the requirements of their ideal.332 Traditionally, Texas has always
deferred to the market participants and received push back to market reform
by industrial customers.333 One of the main reasons that the Texas market
has become so underequipped to value the construction of new power
plants is because the industrial load is extremely politically powerful (e.g.,
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Catherine Wolfram, The Problem with Demand Response (Sep. 25, 2017),
https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2017/09/25/the-problem-with-demand-response/.
329. Bennett, supra note 193.
330. Id.
331. Rilinger, supra note 220.
332. Id.
333. Id.; see Dan Gearino, Texas Politicians Aim to Penalize Wind and Solar in Response
to Outages. Are Renewables Now Strong Enough to Defend Themselves?, INSIDE CLIMATE
NEWS (Apr. 17, 2021), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/17042021/texas-politicians-windsolar-natural-gas-winter-storm/ (“politicians are motivated by who gets them elected, and if
you look at who gets them elected, it’s oil and gas.”).
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downstream petrochemical, industrial steel).334 The industrial load has
extremely compelling arguments and is why this market has not been
modernized and created to better price signals for thermal generation. That
contributes to a culture in which companies have escaped certain
responsibilities and requirements.335 Rulemaking entities, therefore, tend to
curb prices before the market can remunerate generators’ investments.336
In the past, making the market rely on the enforcement actions by
“chronically underfunded regulators” has not proven successful.337
Regulators, like ERCOT and the PUC, are allowed too much wiggle
room.338 When statutory change and compliance are necessary, governing
bodies fix the imperfections by mandating certain behavior by rules.339 But,
when rules conflict with profits, companies tend to lobby against the rulemaking entities, which is precisely what happened to the recommendation
following the 2011 event in Texas.340 Similarly, in “California’s electricity
markets, the power marketers blocked rules that would have corrected
flawed incentive structures.”341 Therefore, even if administrative rules are
put in place, the market almost incentivizes market participants to elude
compliance.342 For this very reason, regulators attempt to align companies’
interests with market mechanisms.343 The designers do so by re-aligning
companies’ interests with reliability requirements.344 For example:
Texas adopted an operating reserve demand curve, which
augments the energy market to reflect the cost of investments in
marginal capacity. Another approach has been to separate
markets for the construction of new capacity. In each case,
designers translate technical reliability requirements into new

334. Lesser, supra note 292; Ferman, supra note 185 (“The natural gas industry has been
among the most politically powerful in Texas for generations and has donated generously to
the campaigns of governors, lawmakers and the Railroad Commission.”).
335. Ferman, supra note 185.
336. Rilinger, supra note 220.
337. Id.
338. Ferman, supra note 185.
339. Rilinger, supra note 220.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
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markets or products. This creates custom-tailored incentives for
companies to meet the requirements of the system.345
Unfortunately, solutions that are contemplated by legislators tend not to
cure the issue that made the solutions necessary in the first place. That is,
the development of new market rules is a very political activity and still
subject to influence.346 Ideal market mechanisms, like the market redesign
discussed above, do not simply serve as blueprints that are automatically
implemented.347 Rather, they offer a common language for experts, market
participants, and lawmakers to use in articulating their objectives and
interest.348 While the compromises may seem promising initially, the
compromises among the entities rarely reflect the logic of the ideal markets
that prompted the design effort. Instead, they tend to express the interests of
the industrial load and powerful incumbents who have a very compelling,
strong voice.349 However, this exact storyline has troubled other markets.350
This repetitive cycle is a wake-up call to the Texas Legislature as the
urgency behind interference by state leaders is necessary to protect Texans
from another tragic storm. While market imperfections may produce new
imperfections, statutory change is still necessary.351 Thus, the Texas
Legislature should not use historical hesitancy and the fear of powerful
players to avoid interference that follows through with the logic of the
ideals that prompted the redesign efforts.
The historical reluctance comes at high costs.352 High costs for
ratepayers.353 Texas ratepayers will ultimately be saddled with billions of

345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. (“Just as the market structure of the first California markets represented the
powerful independent plant producers, so did the auction rules for European capacity
markets that depressed incentives for investment to the benefit of prominent players).
351. One might expect that the industry would reject more regulation, but the oil and gas
companies seem to agree that more regulation is necessary. Will Maddox, How Will Texas’
Weatherization Laws Impact the Energy Industry? (July 21, 2021), https://www.dmagazine.
com/business-economy/2021/07/how-will-texas-weatherization-laws-impact-the-energyindustry/.
352. See generally Meryl Kornfield & Paulina Firozi, Some Texans Received Electric
Bills up to $17,000 after the Storm. How does that Happen?, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/nation/2021/02/21/texas-high-electric-bills/.
353. See, e.g., id.
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dollars in excess energy costs.354 ERCOT kept its wholesale pricing cap in
place for too long during the week of the storm.355 In keeping it at that
price, the market did not bring any more electricity supply onto the grid and
subsequently subjected ratepayers to the high costs.356 Although the total
cost estimate is unknown, calculating the excess cost to ratepayers for the
overpriced electricity is straightforward.357 Over that time when the prices
skyrocketed, electricity demand in Texas was about 50,000 megawatts.
“Thus, a bit of simple multiplication — $6,578 x 80 hours x 50,000 MW —
shows that Texas consumers were overcharged by roughly $26.3 billion due
to the inattention or incompetence of officials at the PUC and ERCOT.”358
The reason that this blunder did not get more attention from the Texas
Legislature is another example of reluctance.359 One of the most plausible
explanations for this reluctance is that state leader, Governor Greg Abbott
appointed the PUC Chair, who signed the order to increase the wholesale
electricity price.360 The PUC Chair’s job before the PUC was serving as one
of Abbott’s senior policy advisors.361 Thus, any further scrutiny of the
actions during the week of the freeze reflects poorly on Abbott.362
Moreover, it is clear the Texas ratepayers will be forced to pay the
biggest costs after Winter Storm Uri. However, “[t]hose bills, those
exorbitant costs should be borne by the state of Texas and not the individual
consumers, who did not cause this catastrophe this week.”363 Deregulation
has resulted in lower electricity prices in Texas for years.364 But now, those
savings are diminishing in the same market, necessitating a closer
investigation into what is more important: political pride or the wellbeing
ratepayers.
354. Robert Bryce, Texas Ratepayers Are Being Saddled with Nearly $38 Billion in
Excess Energy Costs from Winter Storm Uri, FORBES (June 11, 2021), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/robertbryce/2021/06/11/texas-ratepayers-are-being-saddled-with-nearly-38billion-in-excess-energy-costs-from-winter-storm-uri/?sh=7b61cf516785.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Meryl Kornfield & Paulina Firozi, Some Texans Received Electric Bills up to
$17,000 after the Storm. How does that Happen?, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/
2021/02/21/texas-high-electric-bills/.
364. Bryce, supra note 354.
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B. Federal Legislation’s Role in Texas’s Electricity Costs and Energy
Production
Environmental policies could necessitate urgency from the Texas
Legislature as outside factors will continue to influence the wholesale
market.365 Federal subsidies that encourage renewable energy development
by lowering installation cost hurdles are one of the primary issues with
distortion of the Texas market as it stands today.366 When looking at South
Texas, the resource availability is excellent, and it appears to be the perfect
place for the development of wind farms.367 A majority of the reason this
area appears to be so promising is the compelling tax credit that is in
place.368 Unfortunately, the overproduction of one electricity provider
because of an economic incentive is hampering the goal of changing the
energy landscape.369
At present, the development of firm generation is not supported without
the incentive of a firming requirement. Renewable advocates often defend
the incentive structure by pointing out that fossil fuels also receive
subsidies.370 But the difference in amount is significant. 371 Renewable
energy farms are not economically viable without incentives at the federal
level and, thus, justify the incentive. Similarly, the generation of gas, coal,
and nuclear is not economically viable without a firming requirement and,
therefore, should be accepted for the same reason. Accepting the need for
federal legislation in aiding the production of renewable generation can be
mirrored with acceptance of the need for the Texas state Legislature to
assist the production of other resources.
365. See Isaac, supra note 230.
366. Barbara S. Jost, Who pays for firming up variable sources?, POWER MAG. (Sep. 1,
2011),
https://www.powermag.com/who-pays-for-firming-up-variable-energy-resources/
(“These include the production tax credit, the investment tax credit, accelerated depreciation
for certain renewable generation property, and federal loan guarantees for renewables
developers”).
367. Sarah Hutchinson & Laura Rice, Why Texas is Uniquely Positioned to Start
Collecting Windy Energy in the Gulf (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.kut.org/texasstandard/
2021-11-03/why-texas-is-uniquely-positioned-to-start-collecting-wind-energy-in-the-gulf.
368. Isaac, supra note 230.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. (“[S]olar companies receive 75 times more money and wind 17 times more per
unit of electricity generated.”). While renewable sources have received more subsidies than
other generators, debates about energy subsidies should not revolve around which generator
receives more. Bennett et al., supra note 228. The focus must be on how the subsidies distort
the market. Id.
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Additionally, there are questions about how a proposed “clean-electricity
standard” could impact the Texas grid at the federal level.372 The cleanenergy standard is challenging the energy sector to achieve 100 percent
clean energy.373 Some programs require utilities to increase their zeroemission output, imposing a penalty if ignored.374 Although unlikely to
pass, similar regulations on the federal level could get passed in the future,
altering Texas’s control of the production of certain resources. As of now,
the investment market is predicated on that not happening, but given the
policy drivers in place, Texas will have to be prepared to deal with such
regulation. The greenwashing stemming from federal influence is an
essential consideration in the urgency necessary to implement a firming
requirement.375
Texas and other states have taken a stance on ending the cycle of energy
discrimination through environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
investing.376 However, until legislation is filed to prohibit companies from

372. Dominic Anthony Walsh, ERCOT Announces Market Redesign Warns of More
Energy Conservation Requests, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (July 22, 2021), https://www.houston
publicmedia.org/articles/news/energy-environment/2021/07/22/403930/ercot-announceselectricity-market-redesign-warns-of-more-energy-conservation-requests/.
373. See The Biden Plan to Build a Modern, Sustainable Infrastructure and an Equitable
Clean Energy Future, JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/clean-energy/ (last visited Dec.
10, 2021) (declaring the goal of 100% carbon-free power by 2035); see also Nick Sobczyk
& Geof Koss, Manchin could get top role in writing clean energy standard (July 20, 2021),
https://www.eenews.net/articles/manchin-could-get-top-role-in-writing-clean-energystandard/.
374. Daniel Slesinski, Why the Unites States Needs a Clean Electricity Standard, CTR.
FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY RES. (July 8, 2021), https://www.c2es.org/2021/07/why-theunited-states-needs-a-clean-electricity-standard/ (arguing that state-level policies will not be
enough to fully decarbonize the electricity sector and to meet the Biden administration’s
goals in the timeframe required to address climate change).
375. See Joanna H. Slusarewicz & Daniel S. Cohan, Assessing Solar and Wind
Complementarity in Texas, Springer Open (Nov. 16, 2018), https://jrenewables.
springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40807-018-0054-3; Isaac, supra note 230 (explaining
that even with the amount of money going into renewables, wind and solar provide for only
four percent of energy nationwide); see also Garrett Golding, Surging Renewable Energy in
Texas Prompts Electricity Generation Adequacy Questions (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.
dallasfed.org/research/economics/2021/0817.aspx (“Renewable energy proliferation in
Texas, increased natural gas use and coal plant retirements reduced electricity sector carbon
emissions by 13 percent over the previous decade even as consumption increased 20 percent,
according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.”).
376. Isaac, supra note 230.
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doing business with the government that boycott or divest from fossil fuels,
it is a good start to ensure energy discrimination does not occur.377
The federal government has a keen interest and responsibility in
supporting the Texas grid resilience because Texas serves as an economic
engine.378 Even though Texas does not possess many linkages with other
states, Texas’s crisis played a significant role in the national gas supply,
which fell by twenty percent.379 The winter storm caused the price of
natural gas to soar nationwide.380 Therefore, the stakes are high, and not just
for Texas, which happens to be the nation’s top energy-producing state.
Texas’s “preparedness affects customers as far away as California
and Minnesota and is a test of America’s ability to deal with climate
change, which is making weather more extreme, more unpredictable and
more deadly.”381
Fixing the regulation problem begins with recognizing that “[we] don’t
have a regulatory system in place that holds the industry accountable.”382
While the federal government should not necessarily bring oversight to the
Texas market, it can provide support to mitigate Texas’s moral hazard.383
The federal government should take pride in ensuring states against highimpact, low-probability events. Instead of defining the capacity of its role
by adding more oversight, the awareness of how renewables and prices
distort the Texas market would aid the federal government’s primary role of
ensuring that states correctly manage risks. Moreover, Texas should be
encouraged to operate and serve as the number one energy producer.384
Because of the federal government’s little regulatory power over Texas,
state interference is even more necessary to prevent federal legislation from
jeopardizing reliability and promote Texas as an economic engine. With
additional guidance in statute, the PUC will have clearer guidance on
377. Id.
378. Michael E. Webber, The Texas Power Crisis Didn’t Have to Happen (Jun. 15,
2021), https://www.asme.org/topics-resources/content/the-texas-power-crisis-didn-t-have-tohappen (“[Texas] is the world’s third-largest natural gas producer.”).
379. Mitchell Ferman, Texas Natural Gas Production Dropped During Recent Cold
Front, Reviving Concerns about Electric Grid, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.texas
tribune.org/2022/01/05/texas-power-grid-natural-gas-cold/.
380. Crowley, supra note 70.
381. Ferman, supra note 185.
382. Id.
383. David C. Wagman, It's Time to Tie the U.S. Electric Grid Together, Says NREL
Study (Aug. 8, 2018), https://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/the-smarter-grid/afteralmost-100-years-of-talk-time-might-be-right-to-strengthen-the-interconnect.
384. See Buchele, supra note 146.
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“writing rules based on laws passed by the state lawmakers, ensuring
reliability in the grid.”385
V. Conclusion
The rapid development of renewable generation in the current market
structure is beginning to create serious reliability issues for the Texas
electric grid, as evidenced by Winter Storm Uri. The Texas Legislature and
the PUC must address these physical realities concretely and start dealing
with them to prevent future electric grid breakdowns. Adding statutory
reform to SB 3 that addresses managing renewable generators will prevent
future blackouts and ensure that costs do not fall on ratepayers.
The current economic structure that the Texas market operates under has
not and will not be sufficient to ensure incentives needed for more firm
generation and, more importantly, ensure the Texas people do not face
another tragic event.386 Prices remain too low to provide the necessary
incentive to increase availability.387 Furthermore, investment is driven
toward generation that keeps the price low without reliability. If the Texas
Legislature does not assist in changing the market design by leveling the
playing field, the PUC will be left to merely raise scarcity pricing.388 In that
case, Texas will be faced with the same issues that caused Winter Storm
Uri⎯continued retirement of coal, nuclear, and gas (collectively “thermal”)
generation.389
Conversely, a well-designed firming requirement that mirrors the
Governor’s directive letter would ensure that variable generators face
accountability.390 Under the current market structure, generators are not
incentivized to provide for the Texas grid, at the lowest possible cost,
which, in turn, passes on to consumers and ratepayers. This occurs because
variable generators are not required to provide a minimum amount of
electricity to the ERCOT grid. If they were so required, during peak
demand periods like Winter Storm Uri, the volatility of prices and supply
would be reduced. The consistency in the market would prevent premature
385. Mitchell Ferman and Jon Schuppe, Texas Hasn’t Done Enough to Prevent Another
Winter Blackout, Experts Say, Texas Tribune and NBC News (Dec 1. 2021),
https://www.caller.com/story/news/2021/12/01/texas-hasnt-done-enough-prevent-winterblackout-experts-say/8809757002/.
386. Bennett, supra note 173, at 14.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
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retirement of existing generation and ensure that adequate investment
secures available resources in the future. Additionally, the variable
generation that is inevitably being added due to out-of-market subsidies will
come with adequate backup power through reliability requirements.
An ideal market structure should be designed around the ratepayers.
“The Texas model of socializing transmission and reliability costs among
ratepayers provides generators with an implicit subsidy and favors
generators that impose more transmission and reliability costs on the
system.”391 While Texas should not ignore what is best for generators,
generators can deliver these outcomes under a system that protects
competition with “uniform reliability standards where companies have
proper incentives to maximize the quality of electricity service for
ratepayers.”392 Thus, the firming requirement aids in achieving the ultimate
goal of an ideal market and prevents consumers from paying for a system of
subsidized backup generation but still retains its fundamental purpose of
allowing flexibility and promoting all forms of generation.
This call to action is urgent due to the high probability that federal
regulation and subsidies will continue to distort the market. In the wake of
unpredictable seasons and climate change, supply issues will cause future
blackouts in Texas. While Texas cannot control external circumstances that
affect the grid (like the weather or federal incentives and mandates), Texas
can change its approach to managing the circumstances. Texas can ensure
that it creates a system that values reliability with its vast energy resources
and provides the lowest cost to the ratepayers.

391. Id. at 4.
392. Id. at 14.
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